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Abstract
Introduction
Disease conditions such as end-stage renal disease
(ESRD), which have severe consequences of disability and
mortality, can generate substantial costs for large employ-
ers providing life insurance and disability insurance bene-
fits. This study is the first to examine such disease-related
nonmedical costs for employers and models the following
employer-paid costs for ESRD in patients with diabetes: 1)
life insurance benefits, 2) disability benefits, and 3) cost of
replacing a worker.
Methods
We simulated a hypothetical cohort of 10,000 individuals
with the age and sex distribution of a typical employee
population in the United States. Data sources for the
model parameters included the United States Renal Data
System and proprietary life insurance and disability insur-
ance claims databases. In addition, we used published
information to identify the structures of typical employee
benefits programs and annual salary information and to
estimate the cost of replacing lost workers.
Results
The study estimated that employers may incur life
insurance costs of $55,055 per ESRD-related death, dis-
ability insurance costs of $31,671 per ESRD-related dis-
ability, and worker replacement costs of $27,869 per
ESRD-related lost worker. Overall, the total monthly cost
per employee with ESRD and diabetes was $5439.
Conclusion
Our study finds that, other than the large direct medical
costs documented in literature, ESRD onset also results in
substantial nonmedical costs for employers. As employers
continue to debate changes in the structure of future
health plan benefits to reduce health care costs, they
should consider potential indirect cost savings of providing
affordable access to medical care that prevents or delays
disability and mortality in their workers.
Introduction
The prevalence of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) has
continually increased over the past 2 decades (1). Between
1980 and 2001, prevalence increased fivefold from 271 to
1400 per million. Much of this growth can be attributed to
an increase in the prevalence of diabetic nephropathy, the
most common cause of ESRD. In addition to the clinical bur-
den of ESRD, preventing or delaying its onset among
patients with diabetes becomes especially crucial in reduc-
ing the economic impact of ESRD on the health care system.
Previous studies have reported substantial ESRD-related
medical costs for health care payers such as Medicare,
Medicaid, and employers (2,3). In one study, the change in
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costs from pre- to post-ESRD onset was nearly twice as
high among those with diabetes as those without. (The
adjusted change in mean costs from preonset to postonset
was $57,973 for those with diabetes and $31,115 for those
without diabetes [3].) Hence, recent research has focused
on interventions to prevent or delay the onset of ESRD in
patients with diabetes. These studies have projected sub-
stantial cost savings in individuals with type 2 diabetes
and nephropathy from the perspective of third-party pay-
ers such as employers or health plans responsible for all
direct medical costs (4).
Employer-sponsored health insurance, which reaches
more than three out of every five nonelderly Americans,
plays an important role in providing affordable access to
preventive health care and medical interventions that
may prevent or delay the onset of conditions such as
ESRD in patients with diabetes (5). However, increases
in health care costs for employers over the past decade
have resulted in many employers scaling back employee
health insurance benefits and some eliminating health
coverage (6). Even as employers have cut back on health
insurance benefits, most have continued to provide other
benefits such as life insurance and disability insurance to
their employees (7). Whereas 62% of all workers received
health coverage from their employer in 2003, 76% had
term life insurance, and 67% had disability insurance in
the same year (7,8). Similarly, although only one in six
(16%) workers who received medical coverage from their
employer did not have to pay for some or all of it, at least
one third of those who received coverage through their
employer had their company pay the entire cost of their
disability (33%), basic term life insurance (38%), and acci-
dental death and dismemberment insurance (35%) (7).
When a worker dies or becomes disabled, these benefits
provide cash payments to the survivors or to the disabled
worker. Because large employers often effectively self-
insure or purchase experience-rated programs for life
insurance and disability insurance benefits, disease con-
ditions that have severe consequences of disability and
mortality can generate substantial costs for employers
providing such benefits.
Although numerous studies have documented employ-
ers’ direct medical costs for workers’ disease conditions (1-
3,9), we are not aware of any studies that have estimated
the economic burden from nonmedical costs, such as life
insurance and disability insurance payments connected to
a medical condition. Because ESRD is an important cause
of mortality and disability in the working-age population,
it may also be associated with substantial nonmedical
costs for employers in particular. Delaying (or avoiding)
the onset of ESRD can consequently affect the cost of life
insurance and disability benefits. It can also affect employ-
er costs when there is a need to replace a worker. However,
there appear to be no estimates of such costs available in
the literature. To better understand the magnitude of the
overall cost implications of ESRD in patients with dia-
betes, a study was undertaken to identify and measure the
nonmedical costs for employers after ESRD onset. This
study provides actuarial estimates of three types of
employer-paid costs for ESRD in patients with diabetes: 1)
employer-paid life insurance benefits, 2) employer-paid
disability benefits, and (3) the cost of replacing a worker.
The costs are estimated for typical large employers that
provide comprehensive benefits to their employees and
have self-insured or experience-rated programs, such as
those in the automobile industry.
Methods
Model population
The study simulated a hypothetical cohort of 10,000
male and female employees aged 20 years and older.
We used standard demographics available from the
2004 Milliman Health Cost Guidelines to model the age
and sex distribution of a typical employee population in
this cohort (10). The demographics in these guidelines,
developed by Milliman, Inc, one of the largest actuarial
firms in the United States, have been adjusted from
U.S. Department of Labor demographics based on data
from large insurers and are more reflective of an
insured population.
Data sources
The study used several data sources to model ESRD-
related nonmedical costs. These data sources include
databases produced by the federal ESRD program and
proprietary life insurance and disability insurance
claims databases. In addition, we used published infor-
mation to identify the structures of typical employee
benefits programs and annual salary information and to
estimate the cost of replacing employees lost to long-
term disability or death.
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Table 1 summarizes the model inputs and data sources
used in the calculation of each type of nonmedical cost.
Life insurance costs
Life insurance provided by employers is structured as
group insurance, which means the policyholder for
insured benefits is the employer, not the employee.
Group life insurance benefits are typically set as a mul-
tiple of salary — typically one to three times annual
salary. Large employers typically finance group life
insurance through effective self-insurance or experience-
rated programs. This means that large employers bear
the direct costs: if life insurance costs are higher or lower
than expected, the employer bears the extra cost or has
the benefit of lower-than-expected costs.
To estimate life insurance costs, age- and sex-specific
prevalence rates of ESRD and diabetes were determined
from the 2003 United States Renal Data System (USRDS)
(11). The USRDS is a national database characterizing the
ESRD population and providing estimates of prevalence
and incidence of ESRD with trends in annual mortality
rates. To produce ESRD-related mortality rates with
greater precision for the age distribution of our hypotheti-
cal cohort, the mortality rates from the USRDS were inter-
polated using the slopes in the 2001 Milliman Basic
Mortality Tables (12) and insurance industry standard
methodology (22). The typical benefits of life insurance pro-
vided by a large employer were then estimated. The com-
ponents that were defined included 1) group life insurance
coverage expressed as a multiple of salary and 2) salary by
age and sex. We reviewed published life insurance and
benefits trade industry references to identify a common
benefit plan offered by large employers for group life insur-
ance. According to these sources, 100% of salary is the
most common plan design and is used in the base-case
analysis (13-15). To test the sensitivity of the model, we
also modeled other common benefits of 150% and 200% of
salary in our analysis. We used U.S. Department of Labor
sources to estimate annual salary by age and sex in large-
employer firms (16,17). In the sensitivity analysis, we var-
ied the salary by 25% higher and 25% lower. Finally, the
life insurance cost to the employer for employees with dia-
betes and ESRD was calculated as the sum product of the
prevalence rates of ERSD and diabetes, the mortality
rates, and the benefit amount.
Disability insurance costs
Disability benefits provided by employers follow a simi-
lar financing and regulatory structure as life insurance
benefits. Depending on the benefit design, disability is
defined as the inability to work in any occupation or in
one’s own occupation. Group disability coverage replaces a
portion of the income that was earned by a disabled work-
er before the disability. Employers provide two distinct
types of disability insurance to employees (23,24). These
include 1) short-term disability, which provides cash pay-
ments beginning when sick days or paid time off are
exhausted and continues until long-term disability begins;
and 2) long-term disability, which provides cash payments
after a 3- to 9-month elimination period following the date
of disability. The most common income replacement pay-
ment across short-term disability and long-term disability
insurance plans is 60% to 80% of final salary. Disability
benefits are paid monthly while the person remains both
alive and disabled. Group long-term disability benefits are
typically subject to a maximum duration until age 65 or
death. However, insurers do sell products that continue
payments beyond age 65 until death or for some specified
period, such as 5 years. Most plans reduce their payment
by the amount of any other disability benefits provided
through other sources, such as Social Security Disability
Insurance, worker’s compensation, pension benefits, and
disability plans with other employers. Most group long-
term disability programs do not contain inflation adjust-
ment benefits.
Most employers who provide disability plans offer both
long-term disability and short-term disability plans. Long-
term disability benefits are commonly designed to begin
when short-term disability benefits expire so that benefits
continue without interruption for disabled employees.
Given the chronic nature of ESRD, most workers with the
condition are expected to transition from short-term dis-
ability to long-term disability unless they receive a kidney
transplant. Hence, we modeled short-term disability and
long-term disability benefit costs together based on the
most common plan design features identified from pub-
lished references (Table 2) (18,19).
The first step was to estimate the rate of ESRD-related
disability claims. This was done by assuming that 90% of
all new cases of ESRD due to diabetes (stratified by age
and sex) identified from the USRDS would become eligible
for disability benefits within the calendar year. This
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assumption was based on our discussions with three insur-
ance company medical directors who specialize in disabili-
ty insurance. Because the assumption of 90% was not
based on published data, we have tested this assumption
as part of our sensitivity analysis.
Next, we estimated the present value of all expected
future disability benefits (PVFB) that will be made to
claimants who become disabled due to ESRD and diabetes
in that year. This is because, unlike life insurance benefits,
which are one-time lump-sum benefits, disability benefits
may be paid for many years after an individual initially
becomes eligible for benefits. For an individual with a dis-
ability, the PVFB as of the end of the elimination period
(i.e., period after which disability payments begin) may be
expressed as a function of the monthly benefit amount,
continuance factors, and the discount rate.
Benefit amount
We assumed that the monthly benefit amount was
equal to 60% of the employee’s monthly income, reduced
by 45% for the impact of benefit offsets from other sources.
An employee’s monthly income was calculated from the
same age- and sex-specific annual salary assumptions
used to model life insurance costs in the previous section.
The 60% income replacement ratio represents the most
typical plan design (Table 2), and the 45% reduction for
benefit offsets represents the approximate difference in
cost between disability plans that do not contain offsets
(which are rare) and those that do contain offsets (which
are the vast majority of plans). The 45% reduction esti-
mate was obtained through an analysis of the rating man-
uals used by three group disability insurers for new busi-
ness sold in 2004. As part of the sensitivity analyses, we
assessed the impact of assuming either a 25% or a 75%
reduction in the benefit amount.
Continuance factors
Continuance factors represent the probability that an indi-
vidual with a disability is eligible for benefits in month t.
Continuance decreases as the value of t (i.e., the length of
the claim) increases, because disability benefits may end
as the result of death or recovery. These factors were devel-
oped through analysis of Milliman’s proprietary database
containing disability claims pooled from four large dis-
ability insurers. It contains information for approximate-
ly 26,300 claims, covering a period from approximately
1998 to 2001. We developed continuance factors for
ESRD-related disabilities by studying the patterns of
claim termination (i.e., deaths and recoveries) for the dis-
ability claims contained in this database with
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision,
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes for renal failure.
Discount rate
The discount rate used to compute the PVFB reflects the
anticipated returns on the type of investments commonly
purchased by disability insurers to fund the future benefit
payments. Most disability insurers invest in investment-
grade bonds and mortgages. As of mid-December 2004,
new-money rates for these types of investments were
approximately 5.5%, which we used to compute the PVFB.
We also conducted sensitivity testing using interest rates
of 4.5% and 6.5%. Finally, the disability insurance cost to
the employer for employees with diabetes and ESRD was
calculated as the sum product of the disability claim rates
and the PVFB.
Cost of replacing a worker
We made two assumptions in estimating the costs that
employers have when replacing a lost worker. First,
because recoveries from renal failure are uncommon, we
assumed that employees who could have returned to
their jobs because of improvements in health (e.g., after
renal transplant) would have been replaced. Second, we
did not include ESRD-related deaths in our estimate of
number of employees that would need to be replaced.
Instead, we assumed that all employees with diabetes
and ESRD who died would be receiving disability bene-
fits before death, and hence, ESRD-related disability
rates account for all employees who will have to be
replaced. We used the friction cost approach and pub-
lished estimates for estimating the employer’s cost of
replacing a lost worker (20,21). For our base-case analy-
sis, we assumed that the expected cost of replacing a lost
worker who becomes disabled because of diabetes and
ESRD is 50% of the worker’s annual salary. We used
age- and sex-specific annual salary assumptions consis-
tent with those in the life insurance section and disabil-
ity rates obtained in the disability insurance section. We
conducted sensitivity analysis using factors of 25% and
100% of employee salary to project the cost of replacing
a worker.
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Base-case results 
Table 3 summarizes the estimates of the ESRD-related
nonmedical costs paid by employers for employees with
diabetes under the base-case scenario. The life insurance
cost was estimated to be $742 per employee with diabetes
and ESRD per month. The estimates for total disability
insurance cost and the cost of replacing a worker were
threefold higher at $2375 per employee with diabetes and
$2322 per employee with ESRD per month. Overall, the
total monthly cost per employee with ESRD and diabetes
was $5439. The average life-insurance cost per ESRD-
related death was $55,055. The average cost per employee
with an ESRD-related disability was $31,671, whereas the
average cost of replacing an employee with diabetes and
ESRD was estimated to be $27,869.
Sensitivity analysis results 
Table 4 presents results from one-way sensitivity
analyses.
ESRD-related life insurance costs
The base-case analysis estimated the cost of life insur-
ance benefits for a life insurance benefit of 1 times the
annual salary. Life insurance benefits of 1.5 and 2 times the
salary are also common benefits among large-employers.
Table 4 shows that the estimates for life insurance costs are
directly proportional to the amount of benefit (i.e., multiple
of annual salary). With a life insurance benefit of 2 times
the salary, the monthly cost per employee with ESRD and
diabetes doubles to $1484 and the average cost per
ESRD–diabetes-related death to $110,110. Similarly,
when salary estimates were modeled at 25% above and
25% below the salary estimates used in the base-case
analysis, the cost to employer was directly proportional to
the increase and decrease in the annual salary assump-
tion, respectively.
ESRD-related disability insurance costs
Sensitivity analysis results using the main parameter
assumptions for estimating disability insurance costs are
shown in Table 4. When the baseline assumption of the
proportion of employees with ESRD due to diabetes who
qualify for disability benefits was decreased from 90% to
75%, the monthly cost per employee with ESRD and dia-
betes decreased proportionally. However, as expected, the
cost per worker with an ESRD-related disability remained
the same. On the other hand, when the percentage reduc-
tion in disability benefits due to offsets for benefits from
other sources was varied from 45% in the base case to 25%
and 75%, the results were inversely proportional to the
change. Finally, sensitivity analysis using interest rates of
4.5% and 6.5% changed the results very slightly.
ESRD-related costs of replacing a worker
Because estimates for the cost of replacing a worker vary
greatly, we projected the cost of replacing a worker assum-
ing replacement costs are 25% and 100% of a worker’s
annual salary. Table 4 shows that the sensitivity analysis
results are directly proportional to the multiple of salary
used, and the replacement cost per worker lost due to
ESRD and diabetes ranges from $13,935 to $55,738.
Discussion
In the literature, ESRD has been associated with enor-
mous direct medical costs among patients with diabetes.
This study finds that ESRD among workers with diabetes
is also associated with substantial nonmedical costs for
employers. For instance, one study has reported that
ESRD onset in patients with diabetes increased annual
direct medical costs by $57,973 per patient. Our study
finds that ESRD onset also results in monthly nonmedical
costs of $5439 per employee with diabetes and ESRD.
Under base-case assumptions, the study estimates that
employers may incur life insurance costs of $55,055 per
ESRD-related death, disability insurance costs of $31,671
per ESRD-related disability, and worker replacement costs
of $27,869 per ESRD-related lost worker. Hence, reducing
ESRD-related disability and mortality can translate into
savings for large employers who self-insure or purchase
experience-rated programs.
The study findings should be viewed in light of the fol-
lowing limitations. First, the results are based on various
model assumptions such as worker salary, mortality, and
disability rates. Actual experience for an employer or
insurer will vary from the results shown here based on its
employee population’s demographics, health status,
salaries, benefit designs, technological advances, and other
factors. Second, we did not calculate employer costs due to
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worker absenteeism or presenteeism at the beginning of
the illness before the worker transitions onto disability
benefits and needs to be replaced. Hence, our estimates on
the cost for replacing a lost worker represent the lower
bound of all productivity costs faced by employers due to
ESRD onset in workers with diabetes. Finally, the results
apply only to large employers who self-insure or purchase
experience-rated programs for life insurance and disability
insurance benefits.
Over the past few years, employers have been under
intense financial pressure because of large increases in
health care costs. Consequently, many have shifted some
of this cost onto their employees in the form of increased
premium contributions, deductibles, and copayments (7).
To curb growth in prescription drug expenditures, many
employers have increasingly moved to tiered formulary
structures and higher drug copayment requirements.
Others have completely eliminated health coverage, pre-
scription drug coverage, or both. Studies have shown that
increased cost-sharing results in lower medical care and
prescription use among patients and substantial cost 
savings for health plans and employers (25-30). Hence,
although medical therapies that prevent or delay the onset
of ESRD in patients with diabetes are available, their use
may be limited among workers with diabetes because of
lack of coverage or higher cost sharing. For instance, cer-
tain medications shown to reduce ESRD in patients with
diabetes have been reported to be frequently placed on the
highest copayment tier of the formulary (31). Studies have
shown that the likelihood of use of such medications is sig-
nificantly lower among patients in tiered copayment drug
plans (25,26,28). Whether such strategies by large employ-
ers to reduce costs of employee health benefits result in
increased outlays for other employee benefits requires fur-
ther empirical study. However, it appears that if scaling
back health benefits to reduce health care costs were to
adversely affect workers’ access to essential prescription
and medical services, and consequently their health, then
employers may have increased costs for life insurance, dis-
ability insurance, and employee turnover.
This study is the first to examine such disease-related
nonmedical costs for employers and focuses on ESRD in
people with diabetes. ESRD is an example of a disease con-
dition that can be prevented or delayed with appropriate
medical interventions, but the disease results in high rates
of disability and mortality. Although the cost estimates in
this study represent employers’ nonmedical costs for
ESRD in employees with diabetes, nonmedical costs for
employers may be enormous for other disease conditions
such as heart disease, cancer, and lung diseases, which
have a substantially higher prevalence and are leading
causes of mortality and morbidity. As employers continue
to debate changes in the structure of future health bene-
fits, they should consider the potential for indirect cost sav-
ings by providing affordable access to medical care that
prevents or delays disease-related disability and mortality
in their employees.
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Tables
Table 1. Model Inputs and Sources Used to Calculate Employer-Paid Nonmedical Costs of Employees with Diabetes and End-
Stage Renal Disease (ESRD), by Type of Cost
Life insurance costs
% ESRD-related deaths
% with diabetes and ESRD USRDS (11)
% ESRD-related deaths USRDS (11) and Milliman Basic Mortality Tables (12)
Life-insurance benefit amounts
Typical benefit as % of salary* Published references (13-15)
Employee salary U.S. Department of Labor (16,17)
Disability insurance costs
% ESRD-related disability claims
% with diabetes and ESRD USRDS (11)
% with ESRD-related disability* Assumption based on medical director interviews
Disability benefit amounts
Typical benefit as % of salary* Published references (18,19)
Length of disability claim (i.e., continuance) Milliman, Inc proprietary disability database
Discount rate Assumption based on expected returns on typical investments by disability insurers
Employee salary U.S. Department of Labor (16,17)
Costs of replacing a worker
% workers lost due to ESRD
% with diabetes and ESRD USRDS (11)
% with ESRD-related disability Assumption based on medical director interviews
Employee turnover amount
Turnover costs as % of salary* Published references (20,21)
Employee salary U.S. Department of Labor (16,17)
USRDS indicates United States Renal Data System.
aAll model inputs except those marked with an asterisk (*) were age and sex specific.
Model Inputa Data SourceTable 2. Most Common Employer-Provided Disability Plan Provisions
Benefit as % of salary 60 60
Maximum monthly benefit $4000 $6000
Elimination period 7 days 180 days
Maximum benefit period 26 weeks To age 65
Definition of disability Unable to work in own occupation Unable to work in own occupation for 24 months or in any occupation thereafter
Social Security offsets Primary and family benefits Primary and family benefits
Table 3. Base-Case Results for Employer-Paid ESRD-related Nonmedical Costs for Employees With Diabetes
Monthly cost per employee with ESRD and diabetes 742 2,375 2,322 5,439
Cost per ESRD–diabetes-related death 55,055 NA NA 55,055
Cost per worker disabled due to ESRD-diabetes NA 31,671 NA 31,671
Cost per worker lost due to ESRD–diabetes-related disability or death NA NA 27,869 27,869
ESRD indicates end-stage renal disease; NA, not applicable.
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Provision Short-term Disability Long-term Disability
Type of Cost Life Insurance, $ Disability Insurance, $ Replacement, $ Total, $VOLUME 3: NO. 3
JULY 2006
Table 4. One-way Sensitivity Analysis Results for Employer-Paid ESRD-related Nonmedical Costs for Employees With Diabetes
Life insurance costs
Base casea 742 55,055
Benefit = 1.5 x Annual salary 1,113 82,583
Benefit = 2.0 x Annual salary 1,484 110,110
Salary = .75 x Base-case salary 594 44,044
Salary = 1.25 x Base-case salary 928 68,819
Disability insurance costs
Base caseb 2,375 31,671
Proportion of ESRD–diabetes patients qualifying 
for disability benefits = 75% 1,979 31,671
Reduction in benefit amount for other benefits 
such as Social Security Disability Insurance = 25% 3,239 43,188
Reduction in benefit amount for other benefits 
such as Social Security Disability Income = 75% 1,080 14,396
Discount rate = 6.5% 2,291 30,544
Discount rate = 4.5% 2,468 32,902
Costs of replacing a lost worker
Base casec 2,322 27,869
Cost to replace lost worker = 25% of annual salary 1,161 13,935
Cost to replace lost worker = 100% of annual salary 4,645 55,738
ESRD indicates end-stage renal disease.
aAssumes life insurance benefit = 1.0 X annual salary.
bAssumes 90% of ESRD–diabetes cases are eligible for disability benefits; 45% reduction in disability benefit amount for other benefits, such as Social
Security Disability Insurance; and discount rate of 5.5%.
cAssumes cost to replace lost worker = 50% of annual salary.
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Monthly Cost per Employee  Average Cost per ESRD–Diabetes-related
Sensitivity Test With ESRD and Diabetes, $ Death or Worker With Disability, $